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Abstract
During the 2010s, collateralized loan obligations rapidly became a trillion-dollar industry, mirror-
ing the growth profile and peak value of its cousin—collateralized debt obligations—in the 2000s.
Yet, despite similarities in product form and growth trajectory, surprisingly little is known about
how these markets evolved spatially and relationally. This paper fills that knowledge gap by asking
two questions: how did each network adapt to achieve scale at speed across different jurisdictions;
and to what extent does the spatial and relational organization of today’s collateralized loan obli-
gation structuration network, mirror that of collateralized debt obligations pre-crisis? To answer
those questions, we draw on the global financial networks approach, developing our own concept
of the networked product to explore the agentic qualities of collateralized debt obligations and
collateralized loan obligations—specifically how their technical and regulatory “needs” shape
the roles and jurisdictions enrolled in a global financial network. We use social network analysis
to map and analyze the evolving spatial and relational organization that nurtured this growth,
drawing on data harvested from offering circulars. We find that collateralized debt obligations
spread from the US to Europe through a process of transduplication—that similar role-based
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network relations were reproduced from one regulatory regime to another. We also find a strong
correlation between pre-crisis collateralized debt obligation- and post-crisis collateralized loan
obligation-global financial networks in both US$- and €-denominations, with often the same net-
work participants involved in each. We conclude by reflecting on the prosaic way financial markets
for ostensibly complex products reproduce and the capacity for network stabilities to produce
market instabilities.
Introduction
When the collapse of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market in 2007 brought about
one of the deepest financial crises in modern times, it was assumed by some commentators
that it would sound the death knell for the structured finance revolution which had trans-
formed loan markets during the early 2000s1. Yet although the CDO market never recovered,
by the end of 2018 amounts outstanding for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)—a close
relation to the CDO—were at or around the same value as the CDO market at its peak, raising
important questions about the regenerative capacity of finance after major crises. Recent
research has highlighted the political dimension of the post-crisis renaissance in securitization
(Aalbers and Engelen, 2015; Braun, 2020). However, there is very little work on how these
markets themselves adapt and reorganize across space and time in order to regenerate and
re-scale at speed, or indeed whether these two securities are organized entirely differently
from each other.
Authors working within the global financial network (GFN) framework have typically under-
stood questions of financial security production and market development by examining the net-
worked relations between large banks operating in global financial centers and a range of
advanced business service providers operating in on- and off-shore jurisdictions (Coe et al.,
2014; Lai, 2018; Wójcik, 2018). This work has provided an integrated way of understanding finan-
cial and territorial network evolution as financial products of different kinds are brought to market.
Other studies have flipped this analysis, examining how the agentic properties of products them-
selves organize financial and spatial networks, facilitating market expansion (Faulconbridge
et al., 2007; Haberly et al., 2019). This paper develops our own concept of the “networked
product” to understand and integrate these dialectical processes, whereby networked actors
shape products as they bring their spatially embedded expertise to bear upon them; and products
shape networks as their technical and regulatory “needs” influence which roles and jurisdictions
are enrolled in their structuration. We explore whether relations of this kind can become mutually
reinforcing or isomorphic, producing the architectural stability that allows markets to scale or
regenerate at speed, which would provide one explanation for the rapid regeneration of structured
finance markets after the 2008 crisis.
To explore this idea, we ask two basic research questions. First, how do securities markets like
CDOs and CLOs organize across multi-jurisdictional spaces to achieve scale at speed? Second, to
what degree do today’s CLO structuration networks, in terms of their actor relations and spatial net-
works, resemble those of CDOs pre-crisis? By answering those two questions we aim to form a
better understanding of how financial networks reproduce in space and time and how financial pro-
ducts play a role in organizing those networks.
We answer these questions through an empirical study which examines the structuration of US$-
and €-denominated CDOs and CLOs using data extracted from 706 offering circulars (OCs)
between the years of 2000 and 2018. We analyze those relations using social network analytic tech-
niques and measure network similarity within and across those markets. We find that CDOs were
able to scale at speed by organizing through a process of transduplication—that product needs led
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to a mirroring of activity-based networks as the market moved from one regulatory regime to
another in search of new collateral to securitize. This organizational form allowed markets for
CDOs—and later CLOs—to scale at speed. We also find a strong correlation between pre-crisis
CDO and post-crisis CLO networks, with often the same network participants involved in each.
However, we do find some evidence of “adaptive resilience” (Wójcik and Cojoianu, 2018) when
regulatory change leads to minor reorganizations in advanced business services. We conclude
that whilst financial securities may embody some degree of calculative and technical complexity,
the spatial and organizational relations which bring those products to market are often simple,
regular, and characterized by recurring patterns of exchange (Christophers, 2009). We consider
the implications of these network regularities for financial market resilience and the possibility
that these network stabilities may create financial market instabilities.
Our work contributes to the literature on the spatial architecture of financial products (Clark and
O’Connor, 1997), the post-crisis renaissance of securitization markets (Aalbers and Engelen, 2015;
Wójcik and Cojoianu, 2018), and the GFN literature generally (Coe et al., 2014; Lai, 2009, 2018).
Specifically, we provide new empirical work on patterns of continuity and change in the relations
between on-shore and “off-shore” centers (see Clark et al., 2015; Wójcik, 2013a) and add to the
ongoing work on the sensitivity of advance business services’ organization to regulatory change
(Haberly et al., 2019; Wójcik, 2013b).
Our paper proceeds as follows: the next section briefly revisits the work on relational global
financial centers and the contributions made by the GFN framework, before outlining our
concept of the networked product to explore the agentic qualities of products in shaping spatial
and organizational relations. In “Data and Method” we describe our self-built database and the
social network analytic methods used to investigate that data. The “Findings” section presents
our empirical results, applying the networked product concept to CDOs and CLOs, establishing
how those securities organize to achieve scale and identifying similarities and differences
between CDO and CLO GFNs. The discussion sets out the implications of our approach,
method and findings for existing and future work; and reflects on the relation between network
regularities and market disruption. The final section concludes the paper.
Framing financial networks: From relational global financial centers to
GFNs and networked products
From the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, economic geography understandings of financial product
and market development advanced through the theorization of global financial centers as relational
sites (Amin and Thrift, 1992; Christophers, 2013; Clark, 2002; Cook et al., 2007; Faulconbridge,
2004; Martin and Pollard, 2017; Wójcik, 2013a). It was argued that global financial centers gener-
ated relational agglomeration economies and competitive advantage (Clark et al., 2015; Wójcik,
2013b) and that these were best understood through four main processes. First, as sites for directing
flows of capital, labor and information in a network of relations that included advanced business
service organizations and institutions (Beaverstock et al., 2005; Clark, 2002; Faulconbridge,
2004; Lai, 2009; Sassen, 1999; Taylor et al., 2014; Wójcik, 2013a). Second, as sites which navi-
gated regulatory difference bridging on- and off-shore jurisdictions (Aalbers, 2018; Clark et al.,
2015; Haberly and Wójcik, 2015), which could be either global financial centers or smaller specia-
lized off-shore financial centers acting as conduits or sinks for flows of assets (Garcia-Bernardo
et al., 2017). Third, as sites to initiate, evaluate, and close business transactions, in a labor
process fostered by trust, reputation, and reciprocity (Beaverstock and Hall, 2012; Dorry, 2016;
Hall, 2011, 2019). Fourth, as sites that generated demand for adjunct advisory and administrative
expertise through the intermediation of advanced business services, sustaining the work of
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particular epistemic communities within and between on- and off-shore jurisdictions (Clark et al.,
2015; Cook et al., 2007; Hall, 2009; Wójcik, 2013b).
These individual studies contributed greatly to our understanding of the spatial contours of finan-
cial market development. However, much of this knowledge was generated in a fragmentary way
through global financial center focused case studies (e.g. Thrift, 1994) or isolated studies of “inter-
city” relations (Beaverstock et al., 2005). From the mid-2010s, Coe et al. (2014) developed a more
unified and holistic approach drawing on the insights of Global Production Network scholarship
(Henderson et al., 2002). The resulting GFN framework produced an integrative analysis of the
key advance business service firms (building on Wójcik, 2013b), and the geography of world
cities and off-shore jurisdictions to conceptualize agency and power relations in financial and ter-
ritorial networks (Coe et al., 2014: 763; Lai, 2018; Wójcik, 2018). The GFN framework has since
been used to frame a multitude of empirical studies from financial networks and regional develop-
ment in China (Pan et al., 2020) to the establishment of fintech ecosystems in Europe (Hendrikse
et al., 2020).
Importantly for the purposes of this paper, the GFN framework acknowledges an enlarged role
for advanced business services which connect and coordinate relations between on- and off-shore
financial centers to produce the networked architectures that allow markets to grow or regenerate
more easily (Coe et al., 2014: 764). There is also some recognition that these networks operate
across different fields and may change over time as regulation or technology evolves. Haberly
et al.’s (2019) analysis of asset management platforms, for example, unpacks the four-pronged
interactions between, “the ‘relational’, ‘virtual’, ‘technical’, and ‘paper’ geography of finance”
where each sphere has its own centripetal and centrifugal processes which combine “to condition
the role and formation of particular financial centres” (p. 169). They argue that technological
change and disruptive innovation could lead to global financial center “de-clustering” or “centrifu-
gal unbundling” as capital and labor seek low-cost solutions and locations, whilst the “paper geog-
raphy of finance” may flow disproportionately to off-shore financial centers as havens for tax
efficiency (Haberly et al., 2019: 170).
GFNs through a product-centered lens: The networked product
In Haberly et al.’s (2019) example, the effects of technological and regulatory change have the
potential to transform products and the spatial and relation organization of their GFN. This
implies a more complex, interactive relation between territories, actors, and products. This multi-
directional causality is the concern of Faulconbridge et al. (2007) who considers the implications
of changes in the stock exchange landscape for financial center development, focusing on the
trade of different financial products in Amsterdam. They conclude that the type of financial
product developed and traded in each center shapes the spatial (re)configuration of Europe’s finan-
cial centers, with implications for the clustering of local epistemic communities. Financial centers,
in other words, may structure financial products, but the characteristics of those products also repro-
duce and reconfigure clusters of expertise within different financial centers.
To apply this product-centered approach within a relational GFN frame, we offer our concept of
the “networked product.” Networked products represent a spatio-temporal mode of organization
based on two orders of interaction: emergence and transformation. In terms of emergence, the
concept describes a dialectical relation whereby a network of actors shape the product as they
bring their situated expertise to bear upon it; but the product also shapes the network as its charac-
teristics create “needs” that influence which roles and jurisdictions are enrolled in its structuration.
Those “needs” are determined by the product’s techno-scientific, risk-mitigating, economic, and
legal characteristics. Consequently, the spatial networks formed depend not only on the location
of skill clusters but also the regulatory environment and the opportunities to lower costs or arbitrage
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rules which are central to what Haberly et al. (2019) term the “paper geographies” of finance. Whilst
the need to lower costs, for example, provides sourcing advantages for actors based in low-tax jur-
isdictions over others (Christophers, 2014; Fleischer, 2010), the wider legal regime—whether con-
tracts are written in English law for example—may also create strong incentives to locate other
activities in a jurisdiction with a similar history of English law systems. These legal complemen-
tarities between territories can emerge from historic colonial dependencies (de Goede, 2020), or
may be engineered actively by states to provide local corporate interests with access to new
markets (Rixen, 2013). A center like Luxembourg, for example, achieved a specialist nodal position
in “investment fund global production networks” by tweaking regulatory structures to reduce costs
for specific tasks, whilst benefitting from wider complementarities between its regulatory regime
and others (Dorry, 2015).
Networked products can therefore explain relational stability, for example if they produce strong
financial incentives for national jurisdictions to preserve or reform rules to protect their domestic
service providers from competition in particularly lucrative structuration networks. Yet networked
products also have the capacity to be transformational (the second order of interaction): the ensem-
ble of actors and products are adaptive, capable of changing form and structure to circumvent legis-
lative impasses or open-up new market opportunities for the product. Understanding the regrowth
of securitization markets from a networked product perspective therefore allows us to consider the
regularities and adjustments in network form that occur when GFNs expand into new territories to
achieve scale, as CDOs did pre-2008; or when whole markets regenerate after a crisis, as was the
case with CLOs after 2008. To understand these processes, we first need to engage with the tech-
nical and organizational features of those products, before mapping the GFNs that arise as a con-
sequence of those product features and the requirements they demand. Our subsequent sections will
do just that, and we describe our data and methods below.
Data and method
To understand the needs generated by CDOs and CLOs, and to then map and analyze the GFNs that
emerge from those needs, we draw on data collected from OCs for both US$- and €-denominated
CDOs and CLOs. OCs detail the participants involved in the structuration process, their location
and their role within the structuration process. We extracted this data, producing our own dataset
on organizational actors and their jurisdictional base, as well as their role played in the structuration
network. Our dataset only comprises CDOs and CLOs for which OCs are publicly available and as
such represents a subset of all CDOs proportionate to the overall volume issued each year according
to SIFMA (2021) (see Figure 1).
We collected data on 428 CDOs and 278 CLOs from OCs made available via the Irish Stock
Exchange (ISE), with a breakdown of numbers by denomination and year in Table 1. In addition,
we located a further source of OCs listed on the Cayman Stock Exchange (CSX), which became
more important in US$-CLO networks after 2016, which we discuss below. Unlike ISE-listed pro-
ducts, OCs are not available online from the CSX website and can only be viewed in person for a
period of 14 days at the CSX offices (Walkers, 2020). We therefore harvested data on firms partici-
pating in the structuration for 98 CSX $US-CLOS from the CSX website and supplemented that
data with information provided by Moody’s, Standard & Poors, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Once built, we conducted a social network analysis of the data in our database. Data was orga-
nized as two-mode networks where each CDO/CLO is connected to a set of actors that fill particular
roles within these GFNs. Each role was filled by one actor only; some administrator functions were
combined because they were performed by the same actor, generally large banks. The base dataset
was coded as binary data, that is—each actor could only be connected to a CDO/CLO once.
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Our prime objective was to explore the underlying structural features of the resulting networks of
relations between parties involved in the issuance of CDOs at a global level. For this purpose, the
two-mode “affiliation” networks were then transformed into a one-mode “co-membership” matrix.
This matrix contained value data which told us how many times an actor jointly engaged with other
actors in the structuration process.
To render these networks visible, we analyzed the co-membership data through blockmodeling to
reveal key structural features (see Borgatti et al., 2013; Glueckler and Doreian, 2016). A traditional
blockmodel approach would group actors with similar positions in blocks using partitions, such as
structural equivalence of actors (see Borgatti et al., 2013); however, as we are interested in the con-
nections or flow between locations we partitioned the network by the location attribute collected for
each actor. This forced actors with the same geographic attribute—for example, NewYork City—into
the same block and relations between blocks presented the geographic flow of information between
the various on- and off-shore financial centers for each of the product networks.
To improve the visualization and to account for differences in membership numbers for each
block, we normalized the block models by dividing all relations by their square root using the
Table 1. Data sources breakdown.
Listing Type Number Timeframe Main nationalities
Pre-GFC US$ ISE CDO 364 2001–2007 US only
€ ISE CDO 64 2004–2008 Irish (39); Dutch (23)
Post-GFC US$ ISE CLO 67 2009–2015 US only
US$ CSX CLO 98 2017–2020 US only
€ ISE CLO 113 2017–2018 Irish (80); Dutch (28)
Abbreviations: ISE: Irish Stock Exchange; CSX: Cayman Stock Exchange; CDO: collateralized debt obligation; CLO:
collateralized loan obligation.
Figure 1. Number of products in our dataset mapped against overall value of all CDO/CLOs issued.
Abbreviations: CDO: collateralized debt obligation; CLO: collateralized loan obligation.
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SQRT-normalization approach in UCINet (Borgatti et al., 2013). The resulting relations were then
overlaid on a map to illustrate the networked nature of the product across on- and off-shore financial
centers. On the map, the thickness of the tie signifies the number of connections or “ties” between
two sites. In addition, a breakdown of firms by type/role is provided in an accompanying table to
capture the distribution of different functions for each location to illuminate the general versus spe-
cialist nature of financial centers within this networked product. The degree of firm concentration
within individual structuration activities can be observed by relating the tie-strength results in the
map to the firm frequency data in the table.
Finally, we compared the structural similarity of the blocked networks using a quadratic assign-
ment procedure (QAP) to test the association between these simplified networks. To do this, we
matched the co-membership network matrices to contain the same rows and columns and conducted
the QAP correlation procedure in UCINet (Borgatti et al., 2013). The results of this routine pro-
vided us with both effect and p-values.
Findings
CDOs as networked products
Our data reveals a remarkable consistency in the roles required to bring both CDOs and CLOs to
market. To understand why that is, we need to explain their comparable “techno-scientific” (Birch
and Muniesa, 2020) features, and hence why our “networked product” concept helps understand
other commonalities in their relational and spatial networks.
CDOs emerged out of the structured finance revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s
(Engelen et al., 2010; Erturk et al., 2013) and the growth of algorithmic credit scoring technologies
(Poon, 2009) which made residential mortgage loans amenable to probabilistic default risk assess-
ment and securitization (Langley, 2008). CDOs allowed banks to transform underlying portfolios of
risky mortgage-backed securities into safe “AAA-rated” securities. They did this by first diversify-
ing the underlying portfolio of securities to minimize default correlation and second, using a
Figure 2. A basic collateralized debt obligation (CDO) structure.
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“Gaussian copula” model to structure and price tranches of securities into hierarchically organized,
differently prioritized legal claims on the income streams of the underlying asset pool (Engelen
et al., 2011). A stylized figure of this process is outlined in Figure 2.
CLOs also date back to at least the early 1990s, yet are backed by risky corporate loans, often
leveraged loans, rather than mortgages (see Carlson and Fabozzi, 1992). CLOs experienced major
growth in the post-2008 period, with some estimates putting the current CLO market value above
the peak CDO market of 2007 (Aramonte and Avalos, 2019). CLOs share many of the same struc-
tural similarities of CDOs: loan repayments from borrowers collateralize tranched securities, and
the Gaussian copula model is still the dominant calculative device used to structure, rate, and
price CLO tranches (ESMA, 2020). And like CDOs, the financial goal of a CLO is to achieve arbi-
trage gains from the spread between the higher return risky collateral and the lower return lower risk
securities they issue.
CDOs and CLOs are similar “networked products” insofar as their technical, economic, and legal
features create demands for similar skillsets and regulatory benefits within their GFNs. First, the
techno-scientific features of the product reinforce the central position of investment banks as deal
arrangers—the locus of CDO/CLO development. Their derivatives teams comprise employees
with refined quantitative skills (MacKenzie, 2011). CDOs and CLOs are, however, also legal tech-
nologies operating in the paper geographies of finance (Haberly et al., 2019) which define commit-
ments and obligations between buyers and sellers through forms of contracting (de Goede, 2015).
This generates a need for advanced business service suppliers—notably legal advisory services.
Additionally, in order to convert default risk into a commodity, it must be isolated from other risks
in order to be quantified and priced (see Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2006). Extraneous risks—such as
the credit risk of the arranging bank—were isolated through the creation of off-balance-sheet
special purpose vehicles (SPVs)which acted as bankruptcy remote issuers and co-issuers of the struc-
tured securities (Gorton andMetrick, 2010).Tomitigate the risk of adverse selection andmoral hazard
—that is, that banks would cherry-pick good assets and offload bad assets to CDO investors—collat-
eral managersworking on behalf of investors would be used to select assets from the market (Duffie
andGarleanu, 2001), an activity overseenbyanother organizational actor—trustees (Tavakoli, 2008).
These risk-isolating and risk-mitigating organizational features also generated a need for supportive
administrative services, including those provided by trustees, but also listing agents and other back-
office administration (Cook et al., 2007). Product needs thus fundamentally shaped the key roles
involved in a CDO or CLO structuration network—they are networked products—and a summary
of those roles and functions can be seen in Figure 3.
Although product needs shape the roles involved in a GFN, role location was shaped by the eco-
nomics of those securities. CDOs generated very low margins for their arrangers—as little as half a
cent in the dollar (FCIC, 2011)2. Scale was therefore important because small margins on a large
volume of assets generate meaningful amounts of profit for the banks who arrange the deals
(Thiemann, 2012). However with such slim margins, reducing or even eliminating regulatory
costs became paramount (Hardie and MacKenzie, 2012), and because financial regulation was
and is nationally-based primarily, there are opportunities to lower costs through regulatory arbitrage
and forum shopping (Pistor, 2013). Yet accessing the optimal mix of low costs and regulatory ben-
efits must be done without creating what is known as a “taxable event” (Tavakoli, 2008). And there
must be complementarities between the legal systems of those different jurisdictions accessed to
reduce regulatory frictions and other costs (Dorry, 2015). These factors combine to construct
GFNs with strong network regularities.
Our network analysis for US$-CDOs is described in Figure 4 and Table 2 and shows the import-
ance of these techno-scientific and cost-based drivers of network structures. New York features,
unsurprisingly, as the key financial center for deal arrangement and trading: most arrangers (nor-
mally investment banks) are based in NYC, whilst many collateral managers are based in the tristate
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area of NYC, NJ, and CT (71), although some are otherwise dispersed across the US (54). The
administrative and oversight roles of trusteeship are also predominantly performed by large
banks based in the US, but operate primarily out of non-NYC cities (e.g. LaSalle—Chicago, IL;
Wells Fargo—Columbia, MD; Deutsche Bank—Santa Ana, CA; JPMorgan and Bank of
New York—Houston, TX), confirming other studies which observe a spatial hierarchy between
trading-based or deal-making activities in core global financial centers and administrative functions
in secondary financial centers within the US (see discussion by Coe et al., 2014).
There are also a very strong relations between the core financial center of New York and the
specialist off-shore centers of Delaware, the Cayman Islands and Ireland: all four jurisdictions
feature in every one of the 314 US$-CDOs for which we have complete data. These repeat relations
are consistent with both Haberly and Wójcik’s (2017: 250) and Christophers’ (2009) findings that
the production of securities of this nature is highly standardized, with strong, enduring network
relationships between key actors and jurisdictions. Skill specialization explains some of this rela-
tional consistency, but much is determined by the regulatory needs of the CDO product. As
Wainwright (2017) notes, financial networks are often structured by arbitrage logics which can
require the linking together of multiple entities located in different jurisdictions to maximize
Figure 3. An outline of the roles within a CDO and CLO structuration network.
Abbreviations: CDO: collateralized debt obligation; CLO: collateralized loan obligation.
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regulatory benefits and minimize costs. Hence, in our CDO network, there is a dual issuer/co-issuer
SPV system to maximize regulatory benefits. A first SPV would ordinarily be a wholly owned
subsidiary of the initial purchaser (investment bank), located in Delaware to which the assets
would be transferred3 from New York. The New York-to-Delaware exchange constituted a “true
sale” in accounting rules and so served to isolate the default risk of the securities from the credit
risk of the bank (Tavakoli, 2008). However, the Delawarean SPV’s status as a wholly owned
subsidiary meant the transaction was classified as a form of intra-company debt financing for the
purposes of US Federal taxation law, and so did not qualify as a taxable event (Tavakoli, 2008: 8).
The exploitation of this “categorical arbitrage”—that is, profiting from legal discrepancies in
the treatment of two forms of conduct that are functionally the same (Riles, 2014)—served to
reinforce long-standing relations between New York and Delaware evident in other studies
(Palan et al., 2009).











NYC, NJ, and CT 19 2 52
Wilmington, US-DE 6 1
United States, other 1 2 9 54
Georgetown, CI 5
Dublin 14
London 3 2 4 2
Rest of the World 4 1
Figure 4. US$-CDO structuration network: relationship strength between sites. Note on maps: For each
location, relations between nodes were aggregated using a block modelling approach. Here line thickness
corresponds to all inter-firm relations and node location for each jurisdiction has been manipulated to match
the map geography.
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From Delaware, the assets were sold or transferred synthetically to a second SPV independent of
the initial purchaser, located usually in the Cayman Islands to achieve jurisdictional arbitrage. The
independent and non-resident status of the Cayman Islands SPV meant it avoided Section 882(a)(1)
of the US Internal Revenue Code, which taxes the net income of foreign corporations if they are
connected to a US trade or business (Carden and Nasser, 2007: 121). The absence of tax treaties
between the Caymans and the US also meant there was no mechanism for reclaiming tax withheld
(Tavakoli, 2008: 17). These specific regulatory features allowed CDOs to incorporate as tax
“exempted companies” (Gorton and Souleles, 2007) and allowed collateral managers who were
US based to select and trade in the underlying asset pool (of mainly US$-denominated assets),
as independent agents of the foreign issuer rather than as a principal; thus exploiting the safe
harbor rules of US tax law (Carden and Nasser, 2007: 121–122). Finally, Ireland became the jur-
isdiction of choice as a listing agent because it triggered the Quoted Eurobond Exemption rules
which reduced tax payable on interest (Arthur Cox, 2013: 3).
The spatial relations constructed by CDOs were therefore in large part a legal contrivance—part
of the paper geography of finance where the virtual “flow” of the product through the four sites of
New York, Delaware, Cayman Islands, and Ireland sequentially were directed by the product’s
need for regulatory cost savings (Morgan, 2008). In networked product terms, the spatial and rela-
tional organizations of the CDO GFN were shaped by the idiosyncratic features of the product,
which deepened skills concentration in particular jurisdictions, facilitating increased CDO
volumes and throughput in a self-reinforcing way.
Achieving scale in €-denominated CDOs through transduplication
Those spatial and relational regularities provided the architecture for the rapid expansion of US
$-denominated CDO in the late 1990s and 2000s. However, as international demand for
AAA-rated fixed income investments increased against a backdrop of low interest rates and regu-
latory incentives for banks to hold low risk assets, demand also grew for €-denominated CDOs
(Tett, 2009). The burgeoning market for €-denominated CDOs grew rapidly from 1999 onward4
(Barclays Capital, 2002). Many European banks had already participated in US$-CDOs either as
buyers from the Irish exchange, or as arrangers through their US subsidiaries (McCauley, 2018).
But to facilitate this growth in €-CDOs, GFNs had to be built within a European space with
quite different regulatory systems and jurisdictional complementarities. Market expansion, there-
fore, meant reproducing the activity network structure with similar regulatory benefits in an
altogether different juridico-political context. Or in Haberly et al.’s (2019) terminology, it meant
constructing new technical and paper geographies to facilitate the extension of CDOs into Europe.
This was achieved through a process of what we term transduplication. Transduplication, in its
biological usage, explains genetic duplication and adaptation as elements with open reading frames
(i.e. the capacity to translate) are transposed and replicated elsewhere, adapting to the environments
they encounter (Joly-Lopez and Bureau, 2018). In our application of the concept this implies certain
network-based processes: it captures the process whereby an architecture of nodes and nodal rela-
tions determined by the techno-scientific, risk-mitigating, economic, and legal needs of the product
integrates with and shapes the inter-jurisdictional relations and spatial environments they encounter
as the market grows.
Transduplication in the €-CDO structuration network was facilitated by at least three develop-
ments, which complement existing research on the dissemination of US securitization knowledge
within Europe (Wainwright, 2015). First, was the liminal position of London as a global financial
center which sat between US and European networks, acting as a site of knowledge and practice
exchange. There was, as Wójcik (2013a) notes, a NY-LON axis upon which this market was
built, with London acting as a coordinating hub for much of the early European CDO GFN
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formation5. Second, US banks with knowledge of the securitization process acted as arrangers for
continental European dealmakers6, facilitated by the formation of associations, such as the
European High Yield Association, which brought together the most prolific US-based securitizers
such as Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, and Goldman Sachs with aspirant European
structurers, asset managers, and investors (High Yield Report, 2001). Third, it required the condu-
cive legal environment and jurisdictional complementarities equivalent to that in US$CDOs to min-
imize tax and regulatory costs. The role of specific national rules, such as those around the
tax-neutral treatment of SPVs in Ireland and Amsterdam (Arthur Cox, 2013: 1–3) played a signifi-
cant role in encouraging the translation of US-like structuration networks into a European context
(see also Thiemann, 2012).
As our network shows (Figure 5), the most important sites in the €-CDO market were London
and Dublin. London played the equivalent role of NYC as a key organizing node in the network as
home to the initial purchasers (banks) and collateral managers (Table 3). Trustees and administra-
tors were also clustered in London—unlike the US, they were not distributed across non-
metropolitan cities, emphasizing London’s pre-eminent role in the UK political economy as a
core financial services hub and as a key location for European and US banks’ global activities.
Dublin acted as Irish Listing and Paying Agent, as it did in US$-CDOs, suggesting skills special-
ization or regulatory advantage. In addition, Ireland acted as issuer for many of the €-CDOs in the
network (39) combining the issuer/co-issuer roles played by the Cayman Islands and Delaware in
US$-CDOs into a single European issuer function. Again, regulatory complementarities mattered:
London-based deal arrangers used mainly Irish issuers because of its English law-based system
(Tavakoli, 2008: 47), again reinforcing Dorry’s (2015) observations about the importance of
legal and regulatory harmony in shaping spatial relations. However, there were also issuers—
approximately one-third—based in Amsterdam, which was also attractive because of its tax benefits
Figure 5. €-CDO structuration network: relationship strength between sites.
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(Engelen, 2007), and the absence of restrictions on the type and origin of assets purchased by SPVs
(Butt et al., 2005; Graaf and Steffens, 2005). US firms retained a position in the €-denominated
CDO network, with collateral managers, and some administrative functions (registrar and paying
agent) appearing as part of larger intra-bank subsidiary arrangements.
Overall, there was greater room for organizational choice within the European CDO structur-
ation network, and thus a less regular structure than in US$-denominated CDOs. While London
and Dublin were dominant, other major financial centers—Frankfurt, Milan, Zurich, and Paris—
also featured as peripheral actors performing multiple functions. There is some evidence of embed-
dedness and home bias—French initial purchasers worked with mainly French collateral managers
for example; but this was not a general trend. Other spatial relations appear to have been organized
on the basis of organizational preference: Citigroup, for example, tended to favor sourcing admin-
istrative functions from Frankfurt. There is no single European equivalent of a Delaware or Cayman
in administrative and advisory functions, which were shared by a number of jurisdictions. The
result is a more diffuse spatial distribution of activities, even though activity roles remain virtually
identical across US and European CDOs.
The structural similarity of CLO and CDO GFNs
The market for both US$-CDOs and €-CDOs collapsed completely in 2008, pushing the inter-
national finance sector into the deepest crisis since the Great Depression. Yet from around 2011
onwards, the market for CLOs grew at a similar rate and in similar volume to that of the early/
mid-2000s CDO market. By Q1 of 2019 CLO amounts outstanding were roughly the equivalent
of the CDO market in 2006, 1 year before the peak (Figure 6); with some estimates putting
CLO market value above the 2007 CDO peak (Aramonte and Avalos, 2019). The context of this
revival was a regulatory easing which followed a concerted lobbying effort on the part of the finan-
cial services industry7 (Aalbers and Engelen, 2015) and the infrastructural power of finance more
generally to shape political agendas in policy circles (Braun, 2020). It also reflected the growth of
the leveraged loan market and the associated conjunctural yield climate of low interest rates, liquid
credit markets, and tight credit spreads which made the comparatively higher returns on CLOs more
attractive to would-be investors (Moldovan and Palligkinis, 2018).
The CLO structuration networks that developed after the 2008 crisis were almost identical to the
networks that helped propel the growth of the CDO market in the 2000s. Our QAP network













Dublin 11 1 12
London 20 7 8 13
Paris 2 5
Amsterdam 3 1 2
Frankfurt 1 2 3
Milan 1 1 1
Zurich 3
Luxembourg 1 4
NYC & US other 3 1 8 7
Georgetown, CI 1 1
Other 1 1
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correlation modelling (Table 4), which examines structural similarities across different networks,
shows that €-denominated CDO and CLO networks are significantly correlated at 0.900∗∗∗.
QAP correlations range from −1 to +1, and so US$-CDO and ISE-listed CLO structuration net-
works are also strongly correlated at 0.676∗∗∗, falling to 0.543∗∗∗ when we account for US
$-CLOs with a CSX listing. The similarity between CDO and CLO structuration networks along
denominated currency lines is therefore striking.
These similarities are brought out further through a comparison of concentration levels, whether
by function or spatial position within the activity of structuration in US$- and €-networks; and by
the involvement of the same actors in core positions across CDO and CLO structuration. Tables 5
and 6 show that in the US$-networks, the Delawarian co-issuer, Puglisi & Associates was the most
Figure 6. Collateralized debt obligation (CDO)/structured finance amounts outstanding versus
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) amounts outstanding ($bn). Source: SIFMA 2021.
Table 4. QAP correlation for blocked network structures.
€CDO €CLO US$CDO US$CLO ISE US$CLO CSX
€CDO 1 0.900∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.013 −0.053
€CLO 1 −0.017 −0.012 −0.039
US$CDO 1 0.676∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗
US$CLO ISE 1 0.728∗∗∗
US$CLO CSX 1
Abbreviations: QAP: quadratic assignment procedure; ISE: Irish Stock Exchange; CSX: Cayman Stock Exchange; CDO:
collateralized debt obligation; CLO: collateralized loan obligation.
Note: QAP correlations range from −1 to +1.
∗∗∗Significant at 0.001.
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Table 5. Concentrations of top 10 firms by function for US$-issued structured products.
US$- issued structured products
US$ CDO US$ CLO
Type Firm Location % of total Type Firm Location % of total
Co-issuer Puglisi & Associates US, Delaware 80 Co-issuer Puglisi & Associates US, Delaware 79
Issuer Maples Finance Georgetown, CI 57 Irish listing agent Maples & Calder Dublin 57
Issuer Walkers SPV Georgetown, CI 36 Issuer MaplesFS Georgetown, CI 52
Trustee/admin Wells Fargo US, other 27 Trustee/admin US Bank US, other 36
Trustee/admin LaSalle US, other 26 Issuer Appleby Trust Georgetown, CI 19
Irish P/L agent Custom House CS Dublin 23 Initial purchaser J.P. Morgan Securities New York City 19
Initial purchaser Merrill Lynch New York City 23 Trustee/Admin Citibank New York City 18
Trustee/admin JP Morgan Chase US, other 20 Initial purchaser Citigroups Global Markets New York City 18
Irish P/L agent McCann Fitzgerald LS Dublin 20 Trustee/admin BNY Mellon Trustee Corp US, other 16
Irish P/L agent NCB Stockbrokers Dublin 20 Irish listing agent McCann Fitzgerald LS Dublin 16









Table 6. Concentrations of top 10 firms by function for €-issued structured products.
€-issued structured products
€ CDO € CLO
Type Firm Location % of total Type Firm Location % of total
Issuer TMF Management B.V. Amsterdam 39 Issuer TMF Management Ireland Dublin 39
Irish P/L agent Arthur Cox Dublin 28 Trustee BNY Mellon London 38
Administrator BNY (London) London 33 Transfer agent BNY SA/NV (Lux) Luxembourg 38
Issuer Deutsche Internat. CS Dublin 31 Administrator BNY SA/NV (Dublin) Dublin 37
Trustee BNY CTS Dublin 27 Administrator Elavon FS London 37
Administrator JPMorgan Chase London 27 Irish listing agent Arthur Cox Dublin 34
Irish P/L agent AIB/BNY Fund Mgmt Dublin 25 Trustee/admin US Bank NA US, other 33
Irish P/L agent J.P. Morgan Bank Dublin 25 Trustee US Bank Trustees London 32
Transfer agent BNY (Lux) Luxembourg 23 Irish listing agent Walkers LS Dublin 27
Initial purchaser Merrill Lynch Inter. London 22 Issuer TMF Management B.V. Amsterdam 26
Abbreviations: CS: corporate services; FS: financial services; CTS: corporate trustee services; LS: listing services; CDO: collateralized debt obligation; CLO: collateralized loan obligation.



















involved actor in both CDO and CLO structuration networks—active in 80% of CDOs and 79% of
CLOs in our dataset. Following that, Cayman Island based Maples were a key issuer and became a
key Irish Listing Agent. We also find various US banks acted as trustees, administrators, and initial
purchasers. Even then, many of the changes in firm presence within the network are explained by
acquisitions, such as, for example, US Bank purchase of LaSalle’s and Deutsche Bank’s trustee
operations in 2006 and 2012, respectively, cementing its position in that market; similarly J.P.
Morgan sold its trustee operations to BNY Mellon in 2006 (Businesswire, 2006a, 2006b).
Hence, despite a significant passage of time, and a large financial crisis, many of the core positions
of the US$-CDO network were held by the same organizations in the US$-CLO network, with
similar concentrations in the market. In the European networks we found similar trends. TMF
Management expanded its role as issuer to cover a combined 65% of the activity in Europe
through its Dutch and Irish operations8. US Bank and BNY dominated the Trustee and Admin func-
tions through multiple subsidiaries (BNY SA/NV and Elavon FS) and Arthur Cox retained its pos-
ition as lead Irish Listing Agent.
The GFNs for CDOs and CLOs are thus strikingly similar, reflecting networked product logics:
the parallel needs of each product produced demands for similar roles and regulatory features,
giving rise to symmetric relational and territorial networks. Where network differences are
evident, they are small and consonant with Wójcik and Cojoianu’s (2018) concept of “adaptive
resilience”—that is, the ability of a system to maintain its integrity by adapting to “external distur-
bances” (Boschma, 2015). €-CLO networks are slightly more European than equivalent CDOs,
with changes mainly in administrative and support services. As the map of €-CLOs issued in
2017/2018 shows (Figure 7), activity remained concentrated across the English Law jurisdictions
of London and Dublin, which acted as core financial centers. In the UK, London continued to dom-
inate the collateral management function, despite the emergence of a few collateral managers
outside of London (Table 7). Luxembourg and Amsterdam retained their specialist functions as
locations for transfer agents9 and issuers. Other financial centers named in €-CLOs remained
Figure 7. €-CLO structuration network: relationship strength between sites and the ego-nets for banks and
subsidiaries.
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peripheral in the sense that they are linked to few products. These included Paris, Frankfurt, and a
selection of Scandinavian cities tied to one CLO only.
There were also small changes in US$-CLOs advanced business services, which became less
European and more North American. This partly resulted from the consolidation of certain activities
in response to the updated “Transparency (Directive 2004/109/EC) Regulation 2007” which made
it no longer a statutory requirement for the issuer to appoint an Irish Paying Agent alongside the
Principal Paying Agent (Figure 8). This did not remove Dublin-based entities from the network
altogether because Irish Listing Agents were unaffected by this legislation and so remained key
nodes until 2016 (Table 8). London also largely disappeared from the network, further reinforcing
the more North American and less European character of US$-CLOs after 2008.
The impact of Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014—Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) in July 2016,
also made listing US$-CLOs on EU exchanges, including the ISE, more costly (Harneys, 2019).












Dublin 7 2 4 7
London 14 2 5 6 25





UK, other 1 6
Scandinavia 1 1 2
Figure 8. US$-CLO structuration network: relationship strength between sites and the ego-nets for banks
and subsidiaries.
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After MAR, some (but not all) market participants began delisting US$-CLOs from ISE’s Global
Exchange Market. To capitalize, the CSX—wholly owned by the Cayman Island Government—
changed their regulation to attract US$-CLOs seeking to avoid MAR in order to capture some of
Ireland’s listings market (MacDonald, 2018), illustrating the imbrication of state action in inter-
jurisdictional off-shore competition (Rixen, 2013). In networked product terms, this is an example
of transformation to circumvent a legislative impasse: the margin profile of CLOs generated a
need for lower costs and thus an incentive for the Cayman Islands to (re)configure regulations to
capture markets, entrench local expertise, and build strength in local epistemic communities. The
expansion of the CSX, in this example, reinforced the skills base of the Cayman Islands as a financial
center—Maples group, for example, acted as both an Irish listing agent as well as a Cayman Island
issuer, but pulled personnel from Dublin to the Caymans post-MAR, enhancing the expertise and
connectivity of the Cayman Islands financial center. Since year-end 2016, the aggregated market
value of all securities listings on the CSX more than doubled from US$198bn to US$428bn
year-end 2019, of which US$262.8bn was specialist debt securities (Lazier and Cornett, 2020).
These changes of financial geography occur when evolving local institutional contexts meet the
cost-minimizing, profit-seeking imperatives of global capital markets (see Lai et al., 2020 for











NYC, NJ, and CT 17 1 2 30
Wilmington, US-DE 3
US other 1 1 10 22
Georgetown, CI 6 1
Dublin 0 10
Note: Delaware is not as visible in this network as before, however, this is not because the jurisdiction is no longer involved
but rather it is an issue of data availability.
Figure 9. US$-CLO structuration network: relationship strength between sites for CSX-US$ CLOs11.
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discussion). The paradoxical effect of MAR, which was designed to increase transparency, was to
push US$-CLO listing functions back into the Cayman Islands (see Figure 9 and Table 9), where
disclosure is weaker (Lazier and Cornett, 2020; cf. Black, 2012).
Discussion: The networked product’s enrichment of the GFN
framework
Our network product approach shows how the techno-scientific, risk-mitigating, legal and eco-
nomic characteristics of a financial product shape the relationships between, and thus the develop-
ment trajectories of, different types of financial center. It therefore has the capacity to enrich
existing GFN research on the way product features give form to the advanced business services
within, and territorial relations between, on- and off-shore worlds (Coe et al., 2014; Haberly and
Wójcik, 2015, 2017; Lai, 2009, 2012, 2018; Wójcik, 2018; Wójcik et al., 2018). A networked
product approach helps to change the way we think about agency in GFNs. It allows us to move
beyond the idea that core decision-making centers freely choose partners, and so determine the
spatial organization of finance and money. Our approach suggests product features constrain the
free associative choices of any one organization located in any one financial center. Networked pro-
ducts tend to produce isomorphic and thus durable relations between products and the network of
sites involved in their structuration; they may also shape the processes of change and adaptation
when product needs encounter legislative impasses. “Adaptive resilience” (Wójcik and Cojoianu,
2018) may result from the isomorphic logics that constrain radical GFN change, rather than any
inherent conservatism in the relational choices of individual companies.
The networked product approach we employ also has methodological implications for GFN
research. Mapping the relational histories of particular financial products through the legal artefacts
they leave behind can also reveal different developmental trajectories and territorial connections
formed as markets emerge. Patterns of network conformity, as we see in our example of CLOs,
can be identified and differentiated from those of transduplication as with European CDOs; or
even patterns of divergence as we might expect to see, for example, in the structuration networks
of mortgage-backed securities and CDOs over time, as different valuation cultures and different
organizations took hold in each (MacKenzie, 2011). As Riles (2006) notes, documents, such as
the OCs we use to construct our social and spatial networks, are “artefacts of modern knowledge”
which contain rich empirical detail about the contractual relations between on- and off-shore actors
that can be difficult to capture through ethnographic or observational research (see also Tischer
et al., 2019), and which remain elusive in studies of world city networks (Taylor et al., 2014).
Networked product mapping could enable the development of typologies of financial network
formation according to the spatial footprints left by the structuration process. This could shed
new light on skills clustering and financial center formation, but it could also illuminate the
strengthening and weakening of relations between centers over time. This, in turn, would comple-
ment the nascent work on the geography of financial innovation (Wainwright, 2015)—explaining,
Table 9. US$-CLO structuration network: firm frequency by function and site for CSX-US$ CLOs.
Initial purchaser Issuer/co-Issuer Trustee Collateral manager Irish listing agent
NYC, NJ and CT 17 28
Wilmington, US-DE 3
US other 1 6 20
Georgetown, CI 5 2
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through the dialectical relation between network and product, how product innovation in a core
hub like New York may create the need to enroll different technical skills located in other finan-
cial centers. It may highlight the different vulnerability of particular nodes within a network:
multi-functional global financial centers may exhibit a stickiness which anchors activity,
which may be less evident in off-shore jurisdictions where regulatory competition plays a
more significant role (Cook et al., 2007; Thrift, 1994). It could thus also augment the corpus
of work on financial center decline (Cassis, 2010; Engelen and Grote, 2009) mapping the
growing peripherality of certain centers as their skill clusters become obsolete when products
change or are replaced.
Our findings highlight, as a consequence, the importance of national regulation and legal actors
in supporting financial market development (Töpfer and Hall, 2018). Our study reinforces Riles
(2014) observation that regulatory arbitrage is at the heart of many financial products.
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to adjust our notion that financial products are built in one
core financial center and that relations to other centers are ancillary. The economics of many finan-
cial products means they are constructed to take advantage of a distributed international architecture
of regulatory loopholes which link on- and off-shore worlds allowing products and their arrangers
to obtain the maximum benefits from each site. That may have implications for what is understood
by a “flow” between these jurisdictions, when there is rarely any tangible movement of goods,
labor, or capital between them; the flow is a legal imaginary or contrivance in the paper geographies
of finance (Haberly et al., 2019).
Moving from the general to the specific, our findings show strong organizational and spatial
regularities in the structuration networks between CDOs and CLOs despite a gap of over 12
years peak to peak and a fundamental discrediting of the CDO market. The language of “complex-
ity” which accompany descriptions of structured credit products can obscure the duplication
embedded in processes of financial innovation and the often prosaic and symmetric relational struc-
tures that emerge when markets form or regenerate (Christophers, 2009). Whether this suggests a
similar fate will befall CLOs to that of CDOs is as yet unclear. It is important to recognize important
differences between CDOs and CLOs—the latter are first-order rather than second-order securitiza-
tions for example—although both may be levered on roughly the same ratio of tangible assets
because CLOs are secured on corporate assets which can be primarily intangible, whilst CDOs
are (ultimately) secured on the properties mortgaged10. The more salient point is that, given how
many market failures there have been, it would be naive to view all of these failures as primarily
the result of idiosyncratic problems in product design. A networked product approach would ask
whether the quotidian sociology of exchange within relatively unchanging structuration networks
produces Minskian tendencies—the tendency for the cushion of safety to decline. Uzzi (1999) sug-
gests repeat exchanges within social networks improve the terms of trade. But if the underlying
product is default risk, improved terms might mean a growing tolerance for lower quality,
higher yielding loans, or strategies to encourage rating agencies to rate a greater proportion of
the product structure as AAA. There is some evidence that leveraged loan quality is deteriorating
(Table 10). Covenant-lite or “cov-lite” loans—that is, those with fewer restrictions for the borrower
and fewer protections for the lender—have increased from 11.46% of the market to 78.17% of the
market since 2011. Similarly, the proportion of those loans given to firms that are 6 times levered or
more has grown from 14.4% to 29.7% over the same period. That deterioration in quality has been
driven by demand from CLOs who now buy ∼65% of all US leveraged loans (Bank of England,
2019; International Monetary Fund, 2019) mirroring the erosion of quality seen in the CDO
market before the 2007/2008 crash.
From a networked product perspective financial centers may therefore provide the relational
infrastructures that produce mundane, repeat interactions which build shared understanding, toler-
ances, and concessions which lower costs for incumbents. That can have a dark side if it produces
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systems of reciprocity, obligation, favor exchange, and dependence which reduce sensitivity to risk
and drive standards down (Skinner et al., 2014). These network regularities which lead forms of
exchange that increase market risk are little acknowledged, but are illuminated by the networked
product approach. It may well be that the network stabilities observed here create market instabil-
ities if the quotidian sociology of exchange within those networks build tolerances, risk-blindness,
and a slow erosion of standards.
Concluding remarks
Our research has shown the utility of the networked product concept and method for enriching the
GFN approach through an understanding of the growth of debt securities markets across jurisdic-
tions and their capacity to replicate and regenerate over time. We show how the risk-mitigating,
arbitrage-led and administrative features of CDOs produced a demand for specialist, spatially situ-
ated skilled inputs and low regulatory regimes, reinforcing existing on- and off-shore strengths and
relations isomorphically. We show that the CDO market grew in the US through strong repeat rela-
tions between New York, Delaware, the Cayman Islands, and Ireland. We also show that those
activity and arbitrage relations were transposed into Europe through a process of “transduplication.”
Once established, those network relations became remarkably durable—the relations formed during
the CDO boom recur in the CLO market 10 years later. We also find similar levels of activity con-
centration with many of the same organizations core to both CDO and CLO networks. Change,
where it is observed, is limited and takes the form of what Wójcik and Cojoianu (2018) call “adap-
tive resilience” in more peripheral advanced business services.
Our findings show how products create and sustain the relationality of GFNs across space and
time. Consequently, we call for a more central positioning of the product in future studies of GFNs
in financial geography. As our study has shown, financial products are not simply the output of
interactivity between world cities, advanced business services and off-shore territories. Products,
like other non-human entities, have agentic qualities (Zook and Grote, 2017), connecting and
reconfiguring those financial and spatial networks isomorphically. We thus provide a different
and novel view of the evolution of structured finance GFNs, one rooted in the technical and
paper geographies of finance (Haberly et al., 2019). A similar approach could be applied elsewhere
to study how, why, and where the processes of structuration take place within a global economy.
Finally, by looking through the prism of the product, and showing the remarkable consistency
between CDO and CLO structuration networks, we echo the skepticism of other authors who have
argued that the emphasis on the complex technical features of financial products obscures many
Table 10. Weakening of covenants and debt coverage, leveraged loans.
Covenant lite loans
Debt-to-EBITDA
<4× 4× –5× 5× –6× >6×
2011–4.Q 11.46 43.90 22.60 19.20 14.40
2012–4.Q 32.79 35.90 26.60 21.80 15.80
2013–4.Q 62.53 31.50 29.00 23.10 16.40
2014–4.Q 60.24 28.70 22.60 21.50 27.20
2015–4.Q 75.99 29.90 24.80 26.50 18.90
2016–4.Q 71.21 21.90 32.60 24.40 21.00
2017–4.Q 76.57 22.70 27.60 27.60 22.00
2018–4.Q 78.17 19.50 24.10 26.80 29.70
Sources: ICE BofAML indices; JPMorgan Chase; Lipper; Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation; BIS calculations.
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relatively mundane, routinized relations, and processes (Christophers, 2009). Our findings suggest
that more work needs to be done to explore whether the enduring relational infrastructures that we
observe in our case study foster patterns of risk tolerance and concession giving more generally in
finance which lead to a decline in standards or even collusive practice, as we saw in the Libor-fixing
scandal. The role of networked products in fostering the network stabilities that produce market
instabilities could provide a potentially fruitful area for future investigation.
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Notes
1. See, for example the conclusions reached by Pratley (2008) and Pittman (2008) in leading national
newspapers.
2. Specifically, Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (2011) exhibit GS MBS-E-010089472.
3. This would be done physically or synthetically via swaps.
4. The first €-denominated CDOwas issued in September 1999. The Euro was introduced on 1 January 1999,
but for the first 3 years was an “invisible” currency. Coins and banknotes were launched on 1 January
2002.
5. Many of the very earliest Euro-denominated CDO deals were put together by London-based asset man-
agers, such as Intermediate Capital Group (ICG) and their Eurocredit CDOs which were placed by
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (The Lawyer 13 September 1999). Other examples include M&G
(Bream, 2001a) and Duke Street (Bream, 2001b). London was also a site for many US subsidiaries’
whose parent operations were involved in CDO structuration, so that London was able to offer the equiva-
lent skills, global connections, knowledge of legal frameworks and a pro-finance regulatory regime of
New York. Meanwhile, EU passporting rights facilitated London as the hub for €-CDOs despite the
UK not being a Euro-currency state itself.
6. Such as Axa’s Concerto II CDO in 2001, which Goldman Sachs arranged.
7. Specifically, in December 2013 an exemption was introduced to the Volker Rule that allowed banks to
take an ownership interest in covered funds comprised solely of loans, servicing rights and other assets
incidental to loan ownership. That allowed banks to buy CLOs backed by loans (not bonds), creating sub-
stantial demand in the leveraged (LSTA, 2020).
8. TMF Management B.V. operates as sole Dutch issuer and over half of Irish issued CLOs.
9. A transfer agent is required when dealing with registered securities where there is the need to maintain a
register of holders and deal with transfers as a consequence of secondary market trading.
10. This factor becomes important in recovery rate assumptions when obligors default and form part of the
CDO/CLO tranching, rating, and pricing calculations.
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11. The absence of offering circulars for US$-CSX CLOs required collection of data from websites that do not
readily disclose the Delawarian co-issuer. Nonetheless, there is evidence for Delaware’s participation: the
continuous dual-issuance of CLOs using both the ‘Ltd’ and ‘LLC’ structured observed in earlier US$-CLO
and US$-CDO issuance. This is confirmed by Lazier and Cornett (2020) noting that only 2 of 54 CLO
structures listed in Cayman Islands in 2019 had no Delawarian co-issuer.
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